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Laughery: Laughery: Putative Fathers' Rights

PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
I.

STANLEY V. ILLINOIS

Most courts and legislatures have traditionally refused to grant parental
rights to the father of an illegitimate child.1 He has been denied custody of
his offspring, his consent has not been required for its adoption, and what
rights he may have as the biological father have been terminated in pro2
ceedings of which he had no notice.
This approach was challenged in Stanley v. Illinois.3 In that case, the
petitioner, Peter Stanley, lived with Joan Stanley for eighteen years and
fathered three children by her which he raised and supported. On Joan's
death, the children were made wards of the court pursuant to an Illinois
statute4 which raised an irrebuttable presumption that all unwed fathers
were unfit to have custody of their illegitimate children. In comparison,
parents of legitimate children and mothers of illegitimate children were
denied cutody of their children only on a showing of abuse or neglect.
Stanley attacked the statutory scheme on the grounds that it denied him
equal protection under the law.
The United States Supreme Court struck down the statute. The Court
recognized that Stanley had a "cognizable and substantial" interest in
retaining custody of his children.5 The court also acknowledged that the
State had a legitimate interest in legislating to protect "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests
of the community,"' but found that the creation of an irrebuttable presumption against the unwed father was inconsistent with the advancement
of that interest. 7 One of the goals of the Illinois statute was to "strengthen
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody
of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal...." 8 The Illinois
presumption, however, might deny custody to a fit unwed parent, contravening the express purpose of the statute. Relying on Bell v. Burson,9

1. For a complete breakdown of relevant statutes see brief for respondent

at Appendix B, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2. See generally Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some
Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father,11 J. F .L. 281 (1971);
Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Fathers Parental Rights, 70 MicH. L. lRv. 1581 (1972); Note, Domestic Relations-Putative
Father's Right to Custody of his Child, 1971 Wis. L. Rav. 1262; Note, Father of
an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 1071 (1966).
8. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 87, § 704-1(1969).
5. 405 U.S. at 652.
6. id.
7. Id. at 652-58.
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, § 701-2 (1969).

9. 402U.S. 535 (1971).

(573)
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the Court found a deprivation of property which, "without reference to
the very factor that the state itself deemed fundamental to its statutory
scheme," 10 violated due process. Procedures more precise than irrebuttable
presumptions were available to determine the parental fitness of the unwed
father. Having found the State's violation of due process, the Court reasoned that since all other biological parents were afforded a hearing, it
was a violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection to deny it to
Stanley."
While Stanley and its progeny 2 have clearly indicated that a father
has some constitutionally protected interest in his illegitimate child, the
cases have been inconclusive as to the scope of that protection. This
uncertainty has complicated the efforts of state legislators to bring their
statutes into compliance with the Constitution and cast a shadow over
adoption proceedings in which the putative father's consent is not obtained.' 3 The result is a legally uncertain adoption and the possibility that
14
the biological father may step forward to claim the child in the future.
The purpose of this article is to analyze a putative father's constitutional rights in adoption proceedings and to present some consideration for
drafting a statute consistent with these rights and in the best interests of
the child.

10. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972).
11. Such reasoning would appear to conflict with the established rule that
the Supreme Court will not consider questions not decided by the lower court.
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
805-06 (1971). The Court justified its decision on the grounds that they decided the case on the issues raised in the lower court by "a method of analysis
readily available to the state court." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 n.10
(1972); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
12. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating
and remanding sub noma. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis.
2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972),
vacating and remanding 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
13. Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1978, at 1.
14. In Missouri, adoption proceedings have been altered in response to
Stanley. In the past, case workers ignored the natural father when placing a
child in an adoptive home. Now, even if the mother requests that the father not
be contacted, caseworkers are required to notify him of the planned adoption
and to obtain a release if possible. If he cannot be reached, most juvenile courts
require documentation that an effort has been made to locate him. Some welfare
agencies have developed a "potentially adoptive" program in response to the
problem. Children whose legal status is uncertain are placed with a foster family
on the understanding that as soon as the legal problems are resolved, the child
will be available to them for permanent placement. These administrative provisions reduce the possible impact of Stanley but do not resolve the problem of
determining what rights must be accorded the putative father.
There is a provision in § 453.040, RSMo 1969, that the consent of a parent
who has willfully abandoned a child for one year prior to an adoption proceeding,
is not needed. However, § 211.021, RSMo 1969, defines parent in the case of the
illegitimate child as the mother. Hence the statute would not seem to apply to
unwed fathers and his rights could conceivably be raised at a later time. Furthermore, where knowledge of the child has been kept from the father, his failure
to meet the child's needs could not be described as willful.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/5

2

1974]

Laughery: Laughery: Putative Fathers' Rights
PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS

II. FouaRTnm m

E

EQUAL PROTECION

The Constitution does not require that a state treat all persons alike.15
A classification, however, must be sufficiently related to a constitutionally
permissible purpose.'6 The key to analyzing an equal protection problem is
to determine which test the court will apply in deciding if the classification is sufficiently related to the purpose of the statute.l 7
The traditional and most frequently applied test is the "rational basis
test"' 8 Under this test the court initially assumes that the statute is valid,
thus placing the burden on the party seeking relief to show that no constitutionally permissible purpose could rationally justify the classification.' 9
If the court finds there is any purpose rationally related to the classification,
the statute is upheld regardless of how unlikely it is that such a purpose
actually motivated the legislation. 20 A classification can be upheld under
the rational basis standard even though it affects persons in addition to
21
those who are legitimate targets of the classification.
A classification distinguishing between fathers of illegitimate children
and fathers of legitimate children would probably be upheld under the
rational basis test. The State has an interest in discouraging promiscuity
and in protecting the family unit.2 2 It also has an interest in protecting the
child by concealing the illegitimate birth and in encouraging the putative
father to legally adopt the child so that he may be held responsible for the
child's well-being. 23 These purposes would justify a state's decision to give
parental rights only to the father of a legitimate child. Likewise, there is a
basis for treating the putative father differently from the mother of an
illegitimate child. Courts have consistently found that the interests of a
child are best protected by awarding custody to the mother.24 Furthermore,
the mother is readily identifiable as one of the parties responsible for the
birth; proof of paternity is often difficult if not impossible.2 5
15. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 880 U.S. 552, 556 (1947);
Tigner v. Texas, 810 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
16. McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
17. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HtAv. L. REv. 1065,
1077-87 (1969).
18. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-20 (1970).
19. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
20. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The
purpose the Court attributes to a statute often determines whether the statute
stands or falls. The Court has used its imagination freely in the past to find a
purpose sufficient to sustain a classification. Coesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948). But at other times it has closed its eyes to a very probable purpose in
order to strike the statute down. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21. Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 848 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
22. Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 11
J. FAm. L. 1, 89 (1971).
23. Brief for respondent at 31-32, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1973).
24. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 63 (1961); M. MEAD, MALE AND FE xL.E
197 (Laureled. 1968).
25. For a discussion on the means and likelihood of establishing paternity
see Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 F~t.L.Q.
252 (1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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If, however, the Court found these classifications were suspect 26 or
impinged on a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, 27 a more
rigorous test would be applied. The Court would not presume the constitutionality of the statute, 28 nor would a mere rational relation between the
statute and its purpose be sufficient.to sustain the classification. 29 Rather,
the burden would be on the state to
provide a compelling state interest
30
precisely related to the classification.
It is unlikely that laws distinguishing the putative father from other
natural parents would withstand this strict scrutiny.3' A classification based
on state policy against promiscuity, or to protect the integrity of the family
unit, would fail for under-inclusiveness. The mother also would have to be
denied parental rights to justify a classification on these grounds. Similarly,
a classification based on the difficulty of establishing paternity would fail
for over-inclusiveness as some putative fathers are readily ascertainable.
The same rationale would apply concerning the best interests of the child.
Some fathers
are better suited to care for their children than are the
32
mothers.
How then could it be argued that a putative father classification is
entitled to strict scrutiny? There are two possible approaches.
A. Sex Is a Suspect Category
States have consistently awarded the legal status of parent to mothers
of illegitimate children and denied it to fathers of illegitimate children. Is
such discrimination based on sex prohibited by the fourteenth amendment?
Historically the Supreme Court has used a rational basis test to review
sex discrimination. 33 In Reed v. Reed,34 the Court, purporting to apply this
test, struck down an Idaho statute favoring men over women as administrators of estates. The statute provided that between persons otherwise
equally qualified to serve as an administrator, there was to be a mandatory
preference for the male. The State argued that the classification had a
rational basis because it simplified probate court proceedings, avoided
intrafamily squabbles, and because men were generally more conversant
in business affairs than were women and hence better qualified to serve
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Hirabayasbi
820 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
27. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
28. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967).
30. McLaughlin v. Florida, 879 U.S. 184, 192-94 (1964).
81. Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection
Father's ParentalRights, supra note 2.

v. United States,
U.S. 1 (1978);
(1969).
of the Putative

82. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967).
38. Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57

(1961); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 88 U.S.
16 Wall.) 130 (1878).
84. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Cf. Goesaert v. Cleary, 835 U.S. 464 (1948),
where the Court had found that Michigan could deny all women the right to
bartend on the ground that the particular dangers of the calling were inappro-

priate to the role and abilities of the woman. See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57, 61-62 (1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/5
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as an administrator 3n5 The Court's rejection of these contentions arguably
represented a hesitant step towards making sex a suspect classification 3 6
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court avoided the issue of whether classifications based upon sex were inherently suspect. Stanley had argued in
state court that the Illinois statute's sex classifications were unjustified
absent a compelling state interest.3 7 The Supreme Court, however, grounded
its decision on the due process clause,38 ignoring both Stanley's equal
protection argument and the Court's own rule that it only passes on issues
decided by the state court.39
40
In Frontiero v. Richardson,
it became clear that the Court was split
on whether sex classifications were inherently suspect. A married female
Air Force officer challenged the constitutionality of statutes which automatically granted the wives of male members of the armed forces dependency status for the purposes of housing and medical benefits, but denied
such status to the spouses of female members unless they were in fact
dependent for over one-half of their support. Justices Brennan, Douglas,
White and Marshall argued for strict scrutiny of the statutes on the basis
that sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by
chance, that there has been a long history of sex discrimination, l and that
42
congressional action indicated the classification was inherently invidious.
Justices Blackmun, Powell and Burger contended the standard of review
used in Reed v. Reed was sufficient to strike down the challenged statutes,
and, since the Equal Rights Amendment was before the people, it would
be disrespectful to the legislative process to apply a different standard of
review at that time.43 Justice Stewart contended only that Reed v. Reed
should set the precedent for the case.44 Justice Rehuquist dissented on the
45
basis that there was a rational basis for the statute.
46
In Kahn v. Shevin, a widower contended that a Florida statute
which allowed widows a $500 annual property tax exemption but provided
85. Brief for appellees at page 12 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
86. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1978); Krauskopf,
Sex Discrimination-AnotherShibboleth Legally Shattered, 87 Mo. L. Rv. 877,
886 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law: the Equal ProtectionClause and Women's
Rights, 19 LoYoLA L. Rxv. 542 (1978).
87. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
88. See Martin, The Equal Rights Amendment: An Overview, 17 ST. L.L.J.

1 (1978).

89. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659-60 (1972).
40. 411 U.S. 677 (1978).
41. Id. at 684-86.
42. Id. at 687.
48. Id. at 692. For a complete discussion of the possible effect of the Equal
Rights Amendment on the review of sex classifications see Brown, Emerson, Falk
and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Right For Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Fathers Parental Rights, 70 MiCn. L. REv.
1581 (1972).
44. 411 U.S. at 691.
45. Id.
46.
U.S.
, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
In Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleui,
U.S.
,94 S. Ct. 791
(1974), the Court held unconstitutional as violative of due process mandatory
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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no analogous benefits for widowers violated fourteenth amendment equal
protection. Justice Douglas for the majority upheld the statute because the
discrimination was founded on a reasonable distinction not in conflict with
the Federal Constitution, namely that the financial difficulties of the lone
woman exceeded those of a man. Justice Douglas, who had based his
decision in Frontiero on a strict scrutiny analysis, now argues that that
case was decided because administrative convenience alone is not a sufficient rationale to sustain a discriminatory classification. Kahn indicates
that the Court will not afford sex classifications strict scrutiny.
B. A Putative Father Has a Fundamental
Interest in His Child
It has been suggested that where a statutory classification impinges
on a fundamental personal interest, a stricter standard of review is applied
than under the rational basis test.4r Can the relationship between a parent
and his illegitimate child be characterized as so fundamental that the
Court will afford it this special protection?
In Levy v. Louisiana,48 five illegitimate children brought an action
for the wrongful death of their mother. A Louisiana statute allowed a
surviving child to bring such an action, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted "child" to mean legitimate child and accordingly denied recovery to the five illegitimate children. The Supreme Court struck down
this interpretation as a violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection.
The Court stated: "In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and
economic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature in making
classifications. .

.

. However, . . . we have been extremely sensitive when

it comes to basic civil rights. . . and have not hesitated to strike down
an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its
side."49 The Court, however, also found that the purpose of the statute
was not rationally related to the classification. As a consequence, the decision
was unclear as to the standard of review applied.50
In Labine v. Vincent,51 an illegitimate child sought to be declared the
sole heir of her father. Even though the father had publicly acknowledged
her as his daughter prior to his intestate death, she was barred by a
school board rules requiring pregnant school teachers to take maternity leave
five months prior to birth. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion contended that
the case should have been decided in an equal protection framework, but did
not reach the issue of whether mandatory pregnancy leave was a classification
based upon sex or physical disability.
That issue was decided in Geduldig v. Aiello,
U.S.
, 94
S.Ct. 2485 (1974). The Court held that it was not a denial of equal protection
for California to exclude disabilities attributable to a normal pregnancy from its
state disability insurance program. "Not every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is sex based . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition.. . ." 94 S.Ct. at 2492 n.20.

47. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 H-Av. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966).
48. 891 U.S. 68 (1968).
49. Id. at 71.
50. Id. at 72.
51. 401 U.S. 582 (1971).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/5
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Louisiana statute which allowed illegitimate children to inherit through
intestacy only where there was no eligible heir other than the State.5 2 In
upholding this statute, Justice Black stated that a state's traditional right
to control the passage of property on death should be free from federal
interference except where a specific constitutional guarantee is violated.
Because the illegitimate child could have taken under a will or through
intestacy had she been legitimized, the Louisiana statute did not create an
insurmountable barrier to her ability to inherit, and therefore, no constitutional guarantee was violated. Justice Black also stated that "[e]ven if
we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis . . .,,53 which indicates that he reached his decision without resort to any of the traditional
equal protection tests. Since the Labine decision was not clearly grounded
on equal protection, it is not helpful in determining the degree of scrutiny
to be applied to illegitimacy classifications.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,54 the Court returned to the
reasoning of Levy in striking down an illegitimacy classification. The deceased father in this instance had four legitimate and two illegitimate
children. He treated them all the same and they all lived together. A
Louisiana statute provided that illegitimate children could recover under
workmen's compensation for injury to their parent only where there were
not enough surviving legitimate children to exhaust the award. As a consequence, the two illegitimate children were not allowed to share in the
workmen's compensation award for their father's death. The Supreme Court
struck down the statute stating that "[when] state statutory classifications
approach sensitive and fundamental rights, this Court exercises a stricter
scrutiny."5 5 Labine was expressly distinguished on the basis that it involved
the disposition of property by inheritance, an area traditionally controlled
by the State. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, proposed a balancing
test to deal with those situations where fundamental personal rights are
threatened. "The essential inquiry. .. is a dual one: What legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?"5 6
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 57 however,
Justice Powell made it clear that only those rights implicitly or explicitly
protected by the Constitution are fundamental rights entitled to the protection of a higher standard of judicial review than a rational basis test. 8
52. Id. at 534.
53. Id. at 586 n.6.

54. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).

55. Id. at 172.
56. Id. at 173.
57. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
58. Id. at 33. Justice Powell in part relied upon Justice Stewart's reasoning
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The court today does not "pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental', and give them added protection ..."
To the contrary, the court simply recognizes, as it must, an established
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less than the Constitution
itself demands.
Id. at 642.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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While Rodriguez involved a finding that education was not a fundamental
right,5 9 justice Powell's analysis of Skinner v. Oklahoma,60 may provide a
clue whether the court will find that a father has a fundamental right or
interest in his illegitimate child.
In Skinner, the strict scrutiny test was applied to a statute requiring
forced sterilization of certain habitual offenders. Justice Powell found that
"implicit in the court's opinion [in Skinner] is the recognition that the right
of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected under the
Constitution."61 While there is no explicit language in the Constitution
guaranteeing a right to privacy, the Court has recognized that certain
personal rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" 2 were exempt from governmental interference absent a showing
of compelling state interest. Within this line of cases are several decisions
directly or indirectly protecting the privacy of the family.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,63 the Court found that a state law that
forbade the use of contraceptives violated the ninth amendment. The right
to procreate was held to be constitutionally protected even though it was
not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Certain rights are so fundamental that their enumeration was unnecessary; the ninth amendment was
expressly included to insure that the enumeration of certain rights could
not be interpreted to mean that other rights were denied. The Court refers
to marriage as "a right of privacy older than the-Bill6 4of Rights- older
than our political parties, older than our school system."
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,65 where a statute forbidding distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons was invalidated under the equal
protection clause, the court stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the married couple is not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 6
In Meyer v. Nebraskay the court found that the fourteenth amendment due process clause protected an individual's right "to marry, establish
a home and bring up children . . . -"sIn Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 9 it
invalidated a statute restricting a child's right to attend parochial schools
59.
60.
61.
(1973).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 85 (1978).
816 U.S. 535 (1942).
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.73-76
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 486.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/5
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stating "the parental right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously
is a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent."70 In
Prince v. Massachusetts,71 the court said "[ift is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the parents....,,72
Based on these cases, it can reasonably be argued that the unwed
father, like the unwed mother, has a constitutional right to privacy in his
relationship with his "family." Classifications which impinge on this right
will be suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. Hence, the father of the
illegitimate child should be treated similarly to the mother of the illegitimate child and the father of the legitimate child. This might mean that on
proof of paternity, the putative father would have a claim to custody of
the child; that such custody could not be denied absent a showing that the
mother was the more qualified or that the father was unfit to be a parent;
and, that regardless of the outcome of the" custody issue, the child could
not be adopted without the father's consent absent evidence of abandonment.
III. Fou R=THN

Ahm

mNT DUE

PRocEss

A. Does Due Process Attach?
Although Stanley v. Illinois73 involved a guardianship proceeding, its
holding that a father's tie to his illegitimate child can not be severed without
due process of law might be equally applicable to an adoption.7 4 Due
process may require that the consent of the illegitimate child's father be
obtained prior to terminating his parental rights and transferring those
rights to the adopting parents.
To be entitled to constitutional procedural safeguards, an interest must
be one contemplated by the fourteenth amendment-life, liberty or property. 75 While these terms have received much consideration, they have never
been precisely defined.7 6 Undoubtedly though, the concept of liberty encompasses more than mere freedom from bodily restraint.77 Stanley v. Illinois 8
has been cited as an example of the broad application the Court has given
to the concept of liberty.7 9 There the Court found that a father's interest
in his illegitimate child was substantial enough to come within the perimeter
of liberty as contemplated by the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated:
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children "comefs] to
this court with a

.

. .

respect [which is] lacking when appeal

70. Id. at 518.

71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
72. Id. at 166.

73. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

74. See, e.g., Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972),
where the Court vacated a judgment curtailing a putative father's parental rights
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Stanley.
75. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
76. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 899 (1923).
77. Bolling v. Sharpe, 847 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

78. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
79. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.80
The Stanley decision is based on the proposition that a father's interest in
his illegitimate child is substantial enough to be protected by the fourteenth
81
amendment.
Yet unresolved is whether a man must fill the social as well as biological role of father to be entitled to this constitutional protection. Recent
Supreme Court decisions concerning the biological family versus the legal
family have involved, like Stanley, well-developed parent-child relationships.82 Must the father acknowledge and assume responsibility for his
illegitimate child to assure him an interest substantial enough to be within
the scope of the fourteenth amendment? Stanley might seem to indicate so:
"The interest being protected was that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised .... 8 3 Some commentators have pointed to this language
to support the argument that Stanley should be limited to its facts-that
only a father who has actively participated in the care of his'children is
entitled to due process before his legal relationship to them can be served
by the court.81 There are four possible arguments against this proposition.
First, one of the illegitimate children in Weber never knew his father,
having been born after his father's death. With regard to this child Justice
Powell states:
The affinity and dependency on the father of the posthumously
born illegitimate child are, of course, not comparable to those of
offspring living at the time of their father's death. This fact, however, does not alter our view of the case. 5
Second, a distinction can be made between a tort action and a proceeding to sever parental rights. Wrongful death and workmen's compensation were unknown at common law."" In creating these actions, legislatures provided for recovery commensurate with the loss incurred. An illegitimate child would not suffer loss upon the death of a father who had
not acknowledged the child's existence.8 7 Therefore, in Levy and Weber
it was important to emphasize that the children had been raised by the
deceased parent and therefore had suffered compensable damages.
Third, it would be a practical impossibility for courts to determine at
what point a father had shown sufficient interest in his child to be entitled

80. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
81. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
82. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (father supported
and lived with illegitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(unwed mother supported and lived with illegitimate children).
83. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (emphasis added).
84. 4 LOYOLA U.L.J. 176 (1973).
85. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 n.7 (1972).
86. Miller, Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough, 19
CAIx. U.L. REv. 283, 289 (1970).

87. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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to due process.88 If parental ties are severed at birth or shortly thereafter,
a father has no chance to develop a relationship with the child. Without
notice he may not even be aware of the birth before his rights are
terminated.8 9
Lastly, the Court in Stanley seems to contemplate that due process
must be afforded a father regardless of the amount of interest he had
shown in his child. In arguing that the states would not be substantially
burdened by the extension of fitness hearings to unwed fathers, the Court
reasoned that unwed fathers with no concern for the disposition of their
children would simply fail to appear after being notified of the dependency
hearings. 90
The biological relationship between father and child would in itself
appear to deserve due process protection in any proceeding which threatens it.
B. Notice
The court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.91 held that,
at a minimum, the due process clause requires reasonable notice and an
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before an
individual could be deprived of life, liberty, or property. 92 In situations
where the affected individual is identified and his address is available,
nothing short of personal service or service by mail will suffice. 3 In
Armstrong v. Manzo,94 failure to give the father of a legitimate child notice
of an adoption proceeding was held to violate due process. 95 Due process
notice requirements may also be required in the adoption proceedings of
illegitimate children.
Such requirements in most adoption proceedings could be met with
only slight increments in cost and labor. If a man has been adjudged the
father of a child, is named by the mother, lived with the mother at the
time of conception, or has assumed the social responsibilities of a father,
notice may be served under existing state statutes.9 6 If more than one man
could be the father, then all should be served with the burden of proving
paternity on the men claiming it. Problems of service on a man married
97
to another woman are appropriately handled at the administrative level.
The real problem, however, is giving notice to a father who is un-

88. Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father.59 VA. L. REv. 517, 522 (1973).
89. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
90. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
91. 899 U.S. 306 (1950).
92. Id. at 314-15.
93. Id. at 318.
94. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
95. Id. at 550.
96. For acceptable methods of serving process in Missouri see Mo. R. Civ. P.
54.
97. For example, service could be made at the man's place of business or
some other place arranged for in advance. In Missouri a problem might arise in
the interpretation of Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.18 in that it calls for service to be made
at his "dwelling house or usual place of abode."
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known either because the mother is unaware of his identity or refuses to
divulge it. First, while the court has neither the obligation nor right to
threaten or intimidate the woman 98 nor exhaust all possibilities of identification,0 9 it must exercise due diligence. 00 If it can be shown on review
that the court accepted the mother's refusal to identify the father without
any independent investigation, it may well be that the father's interest in
the child was never extinguished on the theory that state action rather than
private interference was responsible for the failure of the father to be
notified.'10
Notification must be handled so that procedural delays are avoided.
Speed is of the essence in the adoption process.10 2 The sooner the child is
placed in a permanent environment, the less likely he will suffer emotional
trauma,"13 and the more likely the adoptive parents will quickly adjust to
their new role.1°1 Further, the natural mother will have the peace 'of mind
of knowing the child is not in an institutional setting. 0 5 Lastly, the older
a child becomes the less likely he will be adopted at all. 08 This means the
child will be deprived of a home of his own and financial burden added
to the state.
If after diligent search the agency cannot identify the father or notify
him by personal or mailed service, one possible method of speedy notification is service by publication. Service by publication, however, may not be
appropriate to an adoption proceeding. Although the court in Stanley
seemed to indicate that notice to an unknown father in the style of "to
07
whom it may concern" would fulfill the requirements of due process,
such a statutory scheme fails to take into account the rights of the mother
and the best interests of the child. Service by publication would be meaningless to the putative father unless it contained the name of the mother
or child. While such publication could not be characterized as a violation
of the mother or child's right to privacy, (since the same information is on
the birth certificate) ,108 it would be contrary to the basic aims of the
adoption process.
Confidentiality has been a cornerstone of the adoption process. 0 9
Shielding the child and particularly the mother from disgrace is of prime
98. Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (1969).
99. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18
(1950). The Court in Stanley clearly did not intend its decision to result in an
undue burden on custody proceedings. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9.
(1972).
100. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
101. Memorandum from the Attorney General of Vermont to the Vermont
State Welfare Department (Oct. 1972).
102. Reid, Principles, Values and Assumptions Underlying Adoption Practices, SocrL WorK,January, 1957.
103. J. BoWLBY, CMLD CAmE AND THE GRo -H OF LoVE (2d ed. 1965).
104. See Child Welfare League of America, Inc., Child Welfare League of
America Standards for Adoption Services 34 (1968).
105. Id. at 15.
106. Note, note 88 supra.
107. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972)
108. A. MILLEn, Tim AssAuLT ON PmVACY 180 (1971)
109. Child Welfare League of America, Inc., supra note 104 at 10.
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concern. Publication of their situation would have an- addrse effect on
the sensibilities of the parties involved." 0 If a woman knew a publication requirement existed, she might resort to placing the child through
a private physician or on the black market where' her privacy would
be respected."' In such cases no accredited welfare agency screens the
adoptive home. Also, such adoptions are generally not legally secure.
Furthermore, the more exposure the adoption process receives, the more
likely the natural parents or adoptive parents will learn of the other's
identity. Later disruption of the placement is then more likely. 1 2 These
3
factors would also discourage other adoptive couples as well."1
While it is difficult to predict the future decisions of the Supreme
Court, it is unlikely that the Court would require notification of the unknown father if it injures the mother or child. The Court could reconcile
such a decision with our traditional understanding of due process by several different approaches.
First, the Court could decide that the unknown father's interest in his
child does not come within the scope of life, liberty, or property. 1 4
Second, it could consider the adoption of the illegitimate children of
an unknown father to be an extraordinary situation that warrants summary
adjudication. Such exceptions have been allowed in the past where harm
to the public was threatened and the private interest infringed on was
deemed to be less important. However, such cases dealt only with
property-like interests," 5 and while the statutes in question provided for
action before a hearing, they also provided for a subsequent hearing to
insure adequate treatment had been afforded the injured party and to make
restitution if necessary.1 6 But bearing in mind that "the very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every unimaginable situation,"" 7 the adoption situation might
be so unique and the interest of the State so basic that summary adjudication 'would be allowed. Mullane held that "a construction of the due
process clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in
the way [of the State] could not be justified.""l8
110. Memorandum from Child Welfare League of America, Inc., Jean Rubin,
Consultant on Public Affairs, Aug. 25, 1972.
111. National Observer, Feb. 24, 1973; New York Times, Feb. 20, 1973.
112. Child Welfare League of America, Inc., supra note 104 at 11.
113. See In re Brenan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965).
114. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
115. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950)
(based on the need to protect the public from contaminated food); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (need to protect the depositors of a
Savings and Loan Association); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944)
(need for immediate rent control); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931)
(need of the government to collect taxes); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29, 31 (1928) (need to protect the public from bank failures).
116. In North American Cold Sstorage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908), the Court stated: "If a party cannot get his hearing in advance of the
seizure and destruction, he has the right to have it afterwards ... ." Id. at 316.
117. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
118. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950).
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Third, while publication has been the usual form of constructive service, the requirements of due process are not technical. 19 Normally the
court suggests a procedure which is an acceptable model, leaving the states
free to devise their own so long as they are in compliance with the basic
precepts of due process. 120 Furthermore, the courts have made it clear that
due process is an amorphous concept.12 Once it has been determined that
an interest is protected by the fourteenth amendment, the form the protection may take varies according to the specific factual context, 22 "the nature
of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding and the possible
burden on that proceeding.

.

."'2

Essentially this is a balancing

process 2 4 where societal interest in summary judgment is weighed against
the interest of the parties. 125 Since the interest of the unknown father is
minimal compared to the possible injury to the mother and child, it seems
reasonable that the unknown father need be afforded only the most minimal protection to comply with the precepts of due process.
IV. POssIBLE STATUTORY SOLUONS

Laws denying a putative father's right to his child were originally
formulated to protect him from an embarrassing and financially burdensome relationship, 2 not to insure the best interests of the child. Any procedure to terminate parental rights should provide safeguards so the father
who wishes to provide emotional as well as financial support for his child
may do so. The Child Welfare League of America has proposed that two
requirements to be met in the adoption process are: (1) that the rights of
natural parents be safeguarded; and (2) that no child be unnecessarily
deprived of parents or a home of his own. 127

Michigan has enacted a statute 2 8 which places part of the burden of
notification on the father. It states:
Release for purposes of adoption given only by a mother of a child
born out of wedlock is sufficient and rights of any putative father
shall not be recognized thereafter in any court unless the person
claiming to be the father of the child has filed with the probate
court prior to the birth of the child a notice of intent to claim
paternity ....
The statute provides for speedy determination of parental rights immediately after birth without threatening the privacy of mother or child. It also
protects a father interested in the welfare of his child from being denied
119. Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 825 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
120. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 188, 255 (1971).
121. Hannah v. Larche, 863 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
122. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
128. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
124. Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
125. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 871, 878 (1971).
126. For a complete discussion of the historical development of the relationship between a father and his illegitimate child see Brief for Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 52, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
127. Child Welfare League of America, Inc., supra note 104 at 60.
128. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 710.3a (Supp. 1972).
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notification by a mother who refused to identify him. It would, however,
sever the interests of a father not aware of the mother's pregnancy on the
rationale that his interests are not worthy of protection.1 29
It is questionable whether a statute requiring someone to register
before he is afforded due process is constitutional. An individual does not
need to take any procedural steps to be protected from unwarranted search
and seizure or to secure equal protection under the law. Those rights,
like due process, are granted by the Constitution and no state legislature
has any power to abridge them.130 Such a statute might be adequate so
far as the unknown father is concerned since the process due him is probably minimal, but as stated in Schroeder v. City of New York,' 3 1 "The
general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are
known or very easily ascertainable." 32 Mullane likely requires that personal notice be given. to fathers whose identity and location are known.
The statute is also overbroad. Although it is aimed at the problem of
the unknown father, it inevitably restricts fathers who are interested in
assuming the responsibilities of parenthood. He and the mother may make
arrangements to raise the child together. After the birth, if the mother
changes her mind and places the child for adoption, it is too late for him
to claim custody; his parental rights will have lapsed. Likewise a father
might not register because the mother has actively kept the pregnancy a
secret from him. Nonetheless, he might still want to assume his parental
role.3 3 The statute might therefore violate equal protection, assuming that
a father has a "fundamental interest" in his illegitimate child which would
require the State
to demonstrate a compelling state interest to sustain the
34
classification.
The proposed Uniform Parentage Act provides for notice by mail
where the father has been identified. Where the father cannot be identified
after diligent search, the presiding judge may determine whether publication
of notice is likely to locate the father. If it is not likely, notice will not be
required. 135 To allow each judge to decide when notice is necessary, however, will create inconsistencies between counties and the possibility of
forum shopping. Furthermore, any publication of notice where the name
of the mother or child would be required seems unwarranted and should
not be left to the discretion of the trial court.
Another defect in the uniform code is a provision that:
Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of
[6 months] after the judgment or order terminating parental rights
is issued . . . the judgment cannot be questioned . . . upon any
ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any re-

Note, note 88 supra.
United States v. Raines, 862 U.S. 17 (1960).
871 U.S. 208 (1962).
Id. at 212-13.
Note, note 88 supra.
See Pt. II, § B of this comment.
135. PROPOSED UNIFoRM PARENTAGE ACT § 24.
129.
130.
181.
182.
188.
184.
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quired notice or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject
matter. 30
Such a provision cannot adequately insulate the statute from constitutional
attack. A proceeding in violation of an individual's right to due process has
no affect on him and a State has no power to make it otherwise.
Illinois has enacted a statute 1 7 that provides for notice by mail to any
man identified as the father of an illegitimate child. If the recipient of
such notice does not file within thirty days a declaration of paternity
stating that he is the father and that he intends to assert his legal rights in
any proceeding concerning the child or that he wishes to have notice of
such proceedings, then his legal rights with respect to the child including
the right to notice of any future proceedings for the adoption of the child
may be terminated without further notice. This statute seems to be a
reasonable resolution of the problems of notifying the identified father.
The notice is reasonably calculated to reach the putative father, clearly
appraises him of his rights and what he must do to insure their protection,
and hence would seem to meet the requirements of Mullane.
A possible solution to the problem of notifying the unknown father
would be to make the birth certificate of the illegitimate child constructive
notice to the world that a hearing to terminate the rights of the natural
parent may be pending. The advantages of this are obvious. The integrity
of the adoption process will be preserved and its aims fulfilled. The illegitimacy will not be exposed anymore than is already required by law and
the father's rights can be terminated anytime after birth when it is in the
child's best interest.
While birth certificates will rarely, if ever, come to the attention of a
putative father, publication is also unlikely to notify him.138 Mullane stated
that where notice cannot be reasonably expected to reach the interested
party, constructive notice is sufficient if "not substantially less likely to
bring home notice than another of the feasible and customary substitutes." 30 Furthermore, a statute making the birth certificate notice to an
unknown putative father is a tangible procedure that can be pointed to
in arguing that due process has been afforded. Such a procedure would
seem commensurate with the minimal interest the unknown father has in
his child considering the overriding concern of the state in protecting
the child.
V. CONcLUSION
It is, of course, futile to try to predict what rights the Supreme Court
will eventually grant putative fathers. But considering the potential damage
to the child which could arise out of an invalid adoption process, it would
seem appropriate to provide a procedure which, though it may give more
rights to a known putative father than constitutionally necessary, would

186. Id.
137. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 37, § 705- 9.4 (P.A. 78-531) (1969).
138. Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
189. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
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guarantee an unchallengeable adoption and a stable relationship for children
and adoptive parents. Merely granting the putative father notice and a
hearing does not mean he will be granted custody of the child. Like any
parent he must first show that he is capable of accepting the responsibilities of parenthood. It would be in the best interests of the child to give
him opportunity to do so. Where the father is unknown, on the other hand,
the best interests of the child dictate that the father be given a minimal
amount of notice of the adoption proceedings. In both situations, the best
interests of the illegitimate child should be controlling.
NAN-FrE

K. LAUGHEY

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 5

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/5

18

